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The Department of Defense and the United States Marine Corps are under increased 
pressure to reduce costs and expenditures in response to the austere financial 
environment. Marine Corps information technology (IT) programs are in jeopardy due to 
budget shortfalls, which may result in reduced military capability. The purpose of this 
study is to test the theory of vicious business cycles, which relates cost reduction to return 
on investment for the Joint Battle Command Platform. The Joint Battle Command 
Platform is an Acquisition Category II program of record designed to meet joint 
requirements for a common C2/SA system between the Army and Marine Corps. In an 
attempt to achieve cost savings, the JBC-P has undergone several cost reduction 
initiatives. Using several value metrics to measure the impact of cost reductions on the 
capability provided by the program, this study determines that cost reductions do reduce 
the value of the military capability provided by the program. These reductions could be 
an indication of a vicious cycle. Identifying the occurrence of vicious business cycles in 
IT programs will allow decision makers to more effectively cut costs without reducing 
military capability.  
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The federal budget and military expenditures have received considerable attention in 
recent years due to increased national debt and an unfavorable economic climate. As a 
result, mandatory budget reductions are being made to many defense programs to include 
those involving information technology (IT) maintenance and acquisition. While budget 
reduction efforts are increasing, the global demand for IT resources and the threats of 
cyber-attacks to the national and military infrastructure are also increasing (Government 
Accountability Office, 2011). The result is an increased requirement for greater IT 
capability, particularly across the Department of Defense. Therefore, the current 
challenge is to reduce costs in order to meet budget restrictions while simultaneously 
continuing to maintain a robust military IT capability (GAO, 2011). However, reducing 
costs without proper analysis has the potential to incur what the private sector terms a 
business “death spiral” or vicious cycle (Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). The business 
vicious cycle is a negative feedback loop, where cost-cutting measures may put higher 
burdens on existing programs and personnel, reducing the quality of the current systems 
and number of qualified personnel leading to further cost cutting due to the perceived 
ineffectiveness (Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). 
The problem is that support for Marine Corps information technology (IT) 
programs are in jeopardy due to budget shortfalls, which may result in reduced military 
capability. The theory of vicious business cycles, relates cost reduction to return on 
investment as a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop (Masuch, 1985). Identifying the 
occurrence of vicious business cycles in IT programs will allow decision makers to more 
effectively cut costs without reducing military capability. This is important because as the 
Marine Corps faces increased budget reductions, and systematically reducing costs in an 
effective manor from within the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps is 
becoming increasingly important.  
The Joint Battle Command Platform is an Acquisition Category II program of 
record designed to meet joint requirements for a common C2/SA system between the 
Army and Marine Corps. In an attempt to achieve cost savings, the JBC-P has undergone 
 xviii 
several cost reduction initiatives. This study uses six value metrics to represent the 
military capability provided by the program. These metrics include the number of 
systems (AAO), number of technical support for the systems, refresh rates, the expected 
life cycle, the PLI reception rate standard, and the system technology type. These metrics 
are compared over time as several implementations of cost reduction initiatives were 
implemented. Using the six value metrics to represent military value or capability, this 
study determines that cost reductions do reduce the value of the military capability 
provided by the program over time. Over the four fiscal years covered in this study, the 
life cycle cost was increasingly reduced with each cost reduction iteration. These 
reductions could be an indication of a vicious cycle. However, there is not enough 
evidence to definitely determine that a vicious cycle is occurring. Cost reductions are 
having a negative effect on the ability of the program to satisfy the Joint Capability Areas 
(JCAs) that it was designed to achieve. Further study is required to determine if similar 
reductions are occurring in other programs in the Marine Corps C2 portfolio. 
Nevertheless, identifying the occurrence of vicious business cycles in this program, as 
well as other IT programs, will allow decision makers to more closely manage cost 
reductions to avoid unnecessary loss in military capability. 
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The federal budget and military expenditures have received considerable attention 
in recent years due to increased national debt and an unfavorable economic climate. As a 
result, mandatory budget reductions are being made to many defense programs to include 
those involving information technology (IT) maintenance and acquisition. While budget 
reduction efforts are increasing, the demand for IT resources across the globe and the 
threats of cyber-attacks to the national and military infrastructure are also increasing 
(Government Accountability Office, 2011). The result is an increased requirement for 
greater IT capability, particularly across the Department of Defense. Therefore, the 
current challenge is to reduce costs in order to meet budget restrictions while 
simultaneously continuing to maintain a robust military IT capability (GAO, 2011). 
However, reducing costs without proper analysis has the potential to incur what the 
private sector terms a business “death spiral” or vicious cycle (Rust, Moorman, & 
Dickson, 2002). The business vicious cycle is a negative feedback loop where cost 
cutting measures may put higher burdens on existing programs and personnel, reducing 
the quality of the current systems and number of qualified personnel leading to further 
cost cutting due to the perceived ineffectiveness (Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). 
The commercial sector and private industry both use return on investment (ROI) 
as a tool for measuring a program’s value (Bingham & Goudreau, 2004). In the private 
sector, ROI is calculated using a dollar value revenue-based approach (Bingham & 
Goudreau, 2004). Determining ROI in public sector, and specifically the Department of 
Defense (DoD), is more problematic because there is not a monetary equivalent for 
revenue (Bingham & Goudreau, 2004). Therefore, ROI in the DoD must be measured 
using a different approach. Any method for analyzing the ROI of program investments 
can also be used to measure the resulting value from cost cutting of IT programs in the 
public and private sector. This is potentially beneficial to the Department of Defense and 
the United States Marine Corps because a thorough understanding of the implications of 
cost reduction measures in IT will allow decision makers to better leverage the 
capabilities if IT systems while simultaneously minimizing associated costs.  
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The Department of Defense and the United States Marine Corps are under 
increased pressure to reduce costs and expenditures in response to the austere financial 
environment. The problem is that support for Marine Corps information technology (IT) 
programs are in jeopardy due to budget shortfalls, which may result in reduced military 
capability. The purpose of this study is to test the theory of vicious business cycles, 
which relates cost reduction to return on investment in IT in the United States Marine 
Corps. Identifying the occurrence of vicious business cycles in IT programs will allow 
decision makers to more effectively cut costs without reducing military capability. This is 
important because as the Marine Corps faces increased budget reductions, and therefore 
systematically reducing costs in an effective manor from within the Department of 
Defense and the Marine Corps is becoming increasingly important.  
This will be a case study of a Marine Corps IT program of record (POR) that is 
undergoing cost reductions. The research methods primarily involve secondary research 
focused on the case of Marine Corps application of cost reduction in IT. Secondary 
research will also include contemporary business case vignettes to understand similar 
industry cost reductions and the consequences of those decisions as a way to compare 
private sector cost cutting methods to Marine Corps methods. Additionally, research will 
be conducted on ROI valuation within the Marine Corps in the budget process as a way to 
understand budget decision-making. Finally, research obtained from reviewing and 
studying ROI valuation and cost cutting in the private sector will be compared to Marine 
Corps methods for the purpose of improving effective cost reduction measures.  
The focus of this research will be to review cost cutting with the Joint Battle 
Command Platform (JBC-P) Family of Systems programs in the Marine Corps. 
Additionally, a qualitative descriptive approach will be used which will analyze the 
impact of cost cutting measures to the ROI of the investment in the JBC-P program. The 
independent variable will be cost reductions and the dependent variable will be ROI. The 
ROI calculations for the studies will be compared to the baseline military capability 
provided by the program before the reductions were implemented. The potential benefits 
that may result from this thesis study include a better understanding of how cost 
reductions in the DoD and the Marine Corps will impact the return on investment in 
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Information Technology programs. As the Marine Corps moves further toward 
implementation of sequestration and other budget reduction measures, Marine Corps 
leadership and financial professionals could benefit from a better understanding of the 
impact that cost reduction measures can have on the organization and their investments. 
As the Marine Corps moves further toward a more robust IT and cyber capability, Marine 
Corps decision makers could benefit from a better understanding of how to generate the 
largest return in value while reducing costs and apply those principles to recognize and 
manage risk in the Marine Corps IT budget process. 
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This chapter provides a brief overview of existing economic theories on return on 
investment (ROI), and vicious cycle theory. This chapter will also provide a background 
on the Marine Corps IT investment vision and strategy. Last, this chapter will cover 
Marine Corps involvement with Blue Force Tracking and Situational Awareness 
technologies including the Joint Battle Command Platform Family of Systems. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The Department of Defense and the United States Marine Corps are under 
increased pressure to reduce costs and expenditures in response to the austere financial 
environment. The problem is that support for Marine Corps information technology (IT) 
programs are in jeopardy due to budget shortfalls, which may result in reduced military 
capability. 
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this study is to test the theory of vicious business cycles, which 
relates cost reduction to return on investment in IT in the United States Marine Corps. 
Identifying the occurrence of vicious business cycles in IT programs will allow decision 
makers to more effectively cut costs without reducing military capability. This is 
important because as the Marine Corps faces increased budget reductions, and 
systematically reducing costs in an effective manor from within the Department of 
Defense and the Marine Corps is becoming increasingly important.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What types of risks are created when large scale cost reductions are 
implemented in IT system procurement and management? 
2. Do funding reductions for IT programs generate a self-perpetuating deviation-
amplifying positive feedback loop with respect to ROI? 
 6 
3. How can DoD leadership more accurately measure ROI to recognize and 
manage risks with regards to reducing funding for IT programs? 
4. How does ROI calculation using a qualitative analysis compare with the current 
DoD ROI calculation in defense budget analysis? 
5. How can the DoD more effectively manage budget reductions so that the 
impact on operational effectiveness is minimized? 
D. BACKGROUND 
In response to mandatory budget reductions, the DoD has been forced to initiate 
significant cost cutting measures (Sharp, 2012). Cost reductions in an organization have 
the potential to cause a death spiral or vicious cycle of downward performance (Rust, 
Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). The vicious cycle is a negative feedback loop where a 
certain behavior reinforces itself and produces detrimental results (Rust, Moorman, & 
Dickson, 2002). In the private sector, the implementation of cost reduction measures may 
initiate firings and loss of benefits, which in turn would result in a reduction in customer 
service, customer loyalty, and sales which would lead to further cost reduction efforts 
(Rust, Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). Cost cutting can also have major implications in the 
public sector, particularly the DoD (Parrish, 2012). Efforts to reduce costs in defense 
programs may put higher burdens on existing programs and personnel, reducing the 
quality of the current systems and the number of qualified personnel (Hillen, 1999). The 
information technology services provided by the DoD IT organizations are no exception.  
1. Vicious Cycle Theory 
In an attempt to increase productivity and control costs, many organizations find 
themselves in a service quality “death spiral” (Olivia & Sterman, 2010). These death 
spirals or vicious cycles occur when organizations attempt to control costs and increase 
throughput, resulting in worker burnout, corner cutting, and service quality reduction. 
This result than produces more cost cutting due to productivity loss and the cycle then 
repeats itself (Olivia & Sterman, 2010). This phenomenon usually occurs when 
productivity growth is perceived to be low. The organization then usually reacts to this 
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perception by implementing cost containment initiatives to make gains in efficiency 
(Olivia & Sterman, 2010). However, this pressure to “do more with less” can force 
programs or organizations to operate with little ability to accommodate demand 
variability (Olivia & Sterman, 2010, p 3). These policies typically result in poor quality 
when demand temporarily rises. In addition, cost reduction initiatives such as these can 
trigger a set of self- reinforcing processes (Olivia & Sterman, 2010). These processes 
lead to the persistent, continual erosion of service quality, service capacity, and the 
customer base. This results in positive feedback loops that function as vicious cycles that 
may lead an organization or program into a death spiral of declining quality, customer 
loss, budget cuts, higher work pressure, poor morale, and higher employee attrition 
(Olivia & Sterman, 2010). This cycle may then continue until the organization or 
program is degraded to the point of ineffectiveness. However, despite the tendency 
naturally toward quality erosion in cost cutting, with the right mix of policies, these same 
positive feedback loops can reverse themselves producing what they term a “virtuous” 
cycle (Olivia & Sterman, 2010). Therefore, it is important to understand how to recognize 
vicious cycles in order to correct them. 
The logic of vicious cycles, or vicious circles as Masuch (1985) refers to them, 
finds its theoretical basis in the concept of action loops. Action loops are built upon the 
theoretical notion of social systems. The basic element of social systems is individual 
human or unit actions (Masuch, 1985). These individual unit actions have four primary 
components, which include the individual actors, the actor’s purpose, the situation to be 
acted upon, and the specific activity itself (Masuch, 1985). The theory is based upon the 
concept that individual actors will act upon their purpose in a given way in a situation in 
a conscious manner that does not intentionally work against that original purpose. The 
result of this unit action is change but one action alone does not constitute a system 
(Masuch, 1985). Social systems comprise repeated actions that form action loops. Action 
loops are created when some action generates a series of other actions which ultimately 
re-create the original situation (Masuch, 1985). When the original situation is re-created, 
the loop can then repeat itself creating a network of activities that result in unique identity 
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characteristics within that environment. This network of activities made up of action 
loops are then referred to as systems (Masuch, 1985).  
In cybernetics, these action loops are called feedback loops. These feedback loops 
are described as being either positive or negative feedback loops. In addition, these 
feedback loops are generally described as approaching some reference point or moving 
away from it (Masuch, 1985). Positive feedback loops can also be described as deviation 
amplifying when related to a normative reference point, or value judgment, and are 
referred to as self-reinforcing when related to factual reference points (Masuch, 1985). 
Page numbers needed with directly quoted material. Subsequently, negative feedback 
loops are described as “deviation counteracting” when referenced to a normative, and 
“self-correcting” when referenced to a fact. Positive feedback loops are feedback loops 
that move away from some reference point and negative feedback loops are loops that 
move toward or remain constant with regard to some reference point (Masuch, 1985). 
However, the reference point depends on perspective. Likewise, determining whether or 
not a feedback loop is a vicious circle also depends on the point of reference.  
Vicious circles are a specific type of feedback loop. These feedback loops can be 
described as deviation-amplifying (vicious circles), deviation-counteracting, self-
reinforcing or self-correcting (Masuch, 1985). Vicious cycles are usually described as 
spirally processes. These processes can be deviation amplifying where a negative impact 
to one variable causes similar negative impacts to other variables and the cycle continues 
until nothing can stop the cycle (Masuch, 1985). This phenomenon then becomes a self-
terminating dynamic. However, sometimes death spirals can occur for a different reason. 
Instead of continually contracting circles, death spirals can also occur form continually 
expanding circles (Masuch, 1985). These circles are fed by outside processes, and growth 
depends on iteratively increasing variables. Eventually the circles exhaust all available 
resources resulting in another type of self-terminating dynamic (Masuch, 1985). Masuch 
argues that deviation-amplifying feedback loops are feedback loops where a change to 
one variable results in the change in other variables that move the circle away from a 
reference point (1985). I think I sent you some APA examples in your Initial Review. 
When you mention a name in the sentence, you only need a date  in the parenthetical 
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citation. Subsequently, if a feedback loop isn’t deviation-amplifying than it is deviation 
counteracting. Deviation-counteracting loops are feedback loops where a change to one 
variable is balanced by an opposing changing variable that counteracts the change 
incurred by the first variable. Deviation counteracting loops tend to move toward or 
maintain themselves with respect to a reference point (Masuch, 1985). Either of these 
feedback loops can also be termed as self-reinforcing or self-correcting if they are based 
on factual reference points (Masuch, 1985). 
 
Deviation-amplifying Deviation counter-acting 








Table 1.   Typology of Feedback Loops (From Masuch, 1985) 
Vicious circles may also occur in combination, with layers of vicious circles 
occurring within the same organization. One type of combination vicious circle is termed 
an explosive feedback loop (Masuch, 1985). Explosive loops combine two or more 
feedback loops where at least one is deviation amplifying. Organizations can have 
multiple layers of vicious circle feedback loops. For example, there can be a layer 1 
vicious circle, a layer 2 vicious circle, and a layer 3 vicious all within the same 
organization. It is easy to then imagine how a change to a variable in the layer 1 vicious 
circle could lead to an explosive loop where that change could cause further changes to 
variables in layer 2 and then layer 3 (Masuch, 1985). Monitored clusters are another form 
of combination feedback loops. Monitored clusters combine one or more deviation 
amplifying feedback loops with one or more negative feedback loops. Monitored clusters 
have more deviation amplifying feedback loops than negative loops. However, the 
negative loops in a monitored cluster are not enough to completely counteract the 
growing vicious circle but instead put a check on the circle’s expansion (Masuch, 1985). 
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Vicious circles are created by human actors due to an inadequate understanding of 
their situation. In particular, the deviation-amplifying feedback loop occurs specifically 
because of an inaccurate assessment of a situation (Masuch, 1985). As a result, the 
continued actions lead further and further away from a desired outcome. The actors are 
often unaware of this behavior because otherwise they would they would likely pursue a 
different policy (Masuch, 1985). Action loops, or feedback loops, are comprised of an 
individual actor, a situation to be acted upon, and the actor’s purpose. The actor pursues 
their purpose in a rational manner, although it may be unconscious. Otherwise, the actor 
would be behaving in such a way as to frustrate their own purpose, which would be 
illogical (Masuch, 1985).   There are three factors that explain why a vicious circle 
continues on its destructive path and remain undetected: (1) participants’ cognitive 
disposition, (2) the complexity of the situation, and (3) the self-concealing nature of 
vicious circles (Masuch, 1985). Vicious circles are dangerous and destructive to 
organizations. However, it is possible to detect them and understanding them can provide 
direction for organizational improvement (Masuch, 1985).   
2. USMC C2 Strategy 
The USMC Concepts and Programs 2013 document outlines the vision and 
strategy guiding the development and acquisition of Marine Corps command and control 
systems (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2013). The vision for Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) Command and Control (C2) is based upon a leader-centric and network-
enabled framework designed to support and enhance the decision making cycle of the 
warfighter. The vision is that Commanders will be able to better command and control 
widely dispersed units across the battlefield (HQMC, 2013). This control is desired to be 
extended down to the company level and below. The vision describes a Marine Corps 
who’s systems are highly connected internally within the organization, as well with joint 
forces and with mission partners. This networked force will then be able to share 
information, collaborate, create adaptive organizations and achieve synchronization and 
integration below the company level (HQMC, 2013). At the core of the MAGTF C2 
vision are the following principles: 
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• Commander/Leader Centric 
• Network enabled 
• Information Assurance 
• Collaborative, shared situational understanding 
• Performed by all echelons 
• Can be performed anywhere in the operational environment 
Within this MAGTF C2 vision is the Marine Corps Information Enterprise 
(MCIEN) strategy. The MCIEN strategy is designed to achieve the goals set out in the 
MAGTF C2 vision. The MCIEN is defined as, “the Marine Corps information resources, 
assets, services, and processes required to achieve decision and execution superiority, and 
to share information and knowledge across the Marine Corps and with mission partners” 
(HQMC, 2013). The vision of the MCIEN is to develop a knowledge-based force that is 
seamlessly connected to essential enterprise capabilities across the full spectrum of 
operational environments. The purpose of this vision is to facilitate enhanced decision 
making, achievement of knowledge superiority, and to gain the tactical, operational, and 
strategic advantage (HQMC, 2013). The MCIEN has also outlined a strategy to support 
the achievement of this vision statement.  
The MCIEN strategy is designed to achieve the MCIEN vision through the 
development of improved communications and services that are both seamlessly 
connected, mobile and secure (HQMC, 2013). The MCIEN strategy is aimed at the 
development of technological systems that enable collaboration, coordinated actions, and 
instant, or near real-time, access to mission-critical data, information, and knowledge 
(HQMC, 2013). Subsequently, the Marine Corps Information Technology Environment 
(MCITE) will focus on the development of systems that more effectively deliver, display, 
and manage data, information, and knowledge across the Marine Corps and DoD 
enterprise (HQMC, 2013). Marine Corps IT investments will be developed as systems 
that enhance the reach of command and control on the battlefield while increasing 
organizational and tactical agility. In addition, IT investments will also focus on 
professional training and educational systems for the organization to educate military 
members and civilian employees on how to leverage these technological advantages 
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(HQMC, 2013). Last, the MCIEN strategy is focused on the development of IA practices 
and technology to protect and defend data, information and knowledge while maintaining 
the technological advantage over adversaries.  
3. Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
The determination of the joint force requirements that drive the development of IT 
systems that support the Marine Corps C2 strategy is made by the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC is the highest-level board and process owner of 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012). The key and statutory responsibility of the JROC is to 
validate joint warfighting requirements (Fast, 2013). The JROC reports to the Secretary 
of Defense regarding the identification, assessment and prioritization of joint military 
requirements (Fast, 2013). The JROC is a staffing organization designed to ensure that 
the needs of the services and component commanders meet the needs of the joint force. 
The JROC’s direct area of interest encompasses ACAT I/IA programs & Joint Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership Policy and Education, Personnel, Facilities, 
and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) Change Requests (DCR) (Fast, 2013). The responsibilities of 
the JROC include advising the Secretary of Defense on the prioritization of requirements 
identified by the Combatant Commands (CJCS, 2012). In addition, the JROC also 
advises the Secretary of Defense on how well the program recommendations and budget 
proposals of the Services, Combatant Commands, and other components of the DoD 
align with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the Combatant Command 
priorities (CJCS, 2012). In summary, the JROC validates the requirements for joint 
acquisition programs and ensures they meet strategic objectives.  
The JROC board permanently consists of a chairman and four council members 
from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, respectively (Fast, 2013). Commas 
always come before using the use of “respectively.: The Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) is the chairman of the council, and council members include the 
Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Chief of Staff 
for the Air Force, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Combatant 
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Commands must be consulted and attend as invited by VCJCS. Currently there is a 
standing invitation for all the Combatant Commands to attend all JROC sessions (Fast, 
2013). The JROC council uses Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) to provide the 
analytical foundation for JROC recommendations and brief the JROC on validation 
recommendations. The JROC then advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
the validation determination made by the board (Fast, 2013). 
4. USMC C2 Portfolio 
The FY12 MAGTF C2 Roadmap outlined a C2 portfolio that was designed to 
provide a strategy for the development of MAGTF C2 systems for the Marine Corps out 
to FY 2020. These same concepts have been carried in to the current FY13 MAGTF C2 
Roadmap (Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development & Integration, 2012). In 
addition, the new FY13 Roadmap incorporates new improvements to the previous year’s 
strategy that are to be achieved through FY 2021. The primary themes are aimed at 
reducing redundant systems and eliminating inefficiencies in order to streamline MAGTF 
C2 (HQMC CD&I, 2012). An important part of the development strategy is to 
continuously monitor and adjust development activities as the needs and priorities of the 
Marine Corps as well as new more effective solutions are identified (HQMC CD&I, 
2012). The MAGTF FY13 C2 Roadmap divides the current C2 portfolio into three 
primary categories: Core MAGTF C2 Systems, Critical Associated MAGTF C2 Systems, 
and Associated MAGTF C2 Systems. There are currently 33 Core C2 Systems, 16 
Critical Associated MAGTF C2 Systems, and 77 Associated MAGTF Systems within the 
portfolio (see Appendix A). The entire portfolio is viewed as the MAGTF C2 System of 
Systems (SoS). Several of these systems are considered to be Family of Systems (HQMC 
CD&I, 2012). The core MAGTF C2 FoSs in the C2 portfolio consist of the following list: 
• JBC-P 
• OPFAC & Networking 
• Aviation C2 
• Tactical Communications & Networking 
• COP Tools 
• Transmission Systems 
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• Switching & Multiplexing 
• Systems Engineering and Integration 
• Miscellaneous 
The relationship between the FoS and SoS is depicted in represented in Figure 1. 
All of these programs are developed with several characteristics in common as outlined 
by the MAGFF C2 Roadmap. These characteristics describe systems that are modular, 
scalable, interoperable, shared, agile, secure, and survivable (HQMC CD&I, 2012). The 
capabilities provided by the individual programs are evaluated based on these 
characteristics.  
 
Figure 1.  Core USMC MAGTF C2 Portfolio (From HQMC CD&I, 2012) 
5. Budget Pressures  
In 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act and put in place the mechanism 
for automatic budget cuts across the U.S. government. On January 2, 2013, the Budget 
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Control Act came into effect and an automatic sequestration of funds was initiated. 
Originally, a budget cap of $546 billion was imposed on the Department of Defense over 
ten years (Harrison, 2012). However, the Congressional Joint Select Committee on 
Deficit Reduction failed to achieve any of the budget reductions that it was charged to 
find and an additional $54.7 billion was imposed on the defense’s budget cap (Harrison, 
2012). This reduced the new budget cap, along with other constraints to $487 billion over 
the next ten years. The Budget Control Act also specified that these cuts would be applied 
as a uniform percentage across the DoD. Of all of the services, the Navy and Marine 
Corps had the smallest budget reduction at 4.3% (Harrison, 2012). However, this 
percentage increases slightly over the next ten fiscal years. In FY13 the Marine Corps 
budget was reduced by $1.2 billion with the potential that further uncertain reductions 
may continue into the future (Harrison, 2012). These budgetary pressures have put 
significant strain on the ability of the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps to fund the 
MAGTF C2 portfolio. 
The current austere financial environment is shaping how the Marine Corps 
manages the MAGTF C2 portfolio. The goal is to meet capabilities requirements while 
achieving greater efficiency, developing new ways of reducing sustainment costs, and 
conducting selective modernization (HQMC CD&I, 2012). Furthermore, in response to 
financial pressures, the portfolio is analyzed against several considerations. These 
considerations include the following categories: amphibious/expeditionary operations, 
sustainment strategy, determination of necessity, and modernization (HQMC CD&I, 
2012). As the Marine Corps reorients from the Middle East areas of operation to the 
Pacific, there is an increased focus on conducting shipboard and ship to shore operations. 
MAGTF C2 systems will need to be developed that meet these operational needs, or their 
value to the organization may be reassessed (HQMC CD&I, 2012). In addition, The 
MAGTF C2 Roadmap describes that programs will be evaluated based on their 
sustainability. Constant sustainment and declining funds increases the risk to the program 
and resources. Therefore, it necessitates the need to develop systems with low 
sustainability costs (HQMC CD&I, 2012). The third consideration when evaluating 
programs in the MAGTF C2 portfolio is the need to determine whether capabilities are 
required capabilities or simply desired capabilities. Expending limited resources to 
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develop capabilities that are non-essential may take resources away from programs and 
capabilities that are determined to be critical to meeting organizational requirements 
(HQMC CD&I, 2012). The last consideration made in evaluating the Marine Corps C2 
portfolio is the need for modernization. The Marine Corps needs to ensure that its 
systems stay modern or it risks losing critical capabilities due to obsolescence. Therefore, 
the Marine Corps is evaluating the C2 portfolio according to a risk-reward assessment 
based on the following criteria (HQMC CD&I, 2012, p 24): 
• Whether the program must continue on its current schedule or risk a loss 
of critical capability  
• The program can be delayed and the impact managed or mitigated  
• Reducing the capacity of the capability is warranted  
• Whether the system cannot be reasonably justified due to the current 
financial environment  
These considerations are shaping the current efforts at budget reduction with 
regard to the MAGTF C2 portfolio.  
6. Return on Investment 
The increasing global threat of cyberattacks has highlighted the importance of 
information technology and “cyber” capabilities within the Department of Defense 
(GAO, 2011). Within the current economic and political environment, measuring the 
return on information technology investments is critical for examining cost efficiency 
(Pavlou, Housel, Rodgers, & Jansen, 2005). In addition, the ability to be able to measure 
the cost and the revenue due to IT, at a specified point in time, would make it possible to 
establish an independent return ratio for productive assets such as IT (Pavlou et al., 
2005). However, the Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense in general, have 
difficulty in determining the market price of defense outputs that reflect society’s 
valuation of those outputs (Hartley, 2011). There is no market price for the value of a 
tank or submarine force as there would be for private sector goods such as cars. Without 
realistic market prices, it is difficult to determine the revenue of what is produced within 
the Department of Defense (Hartley, 2011). As a result, a value determination must be 
made that captures what the output of defense investments are really worth to the 
organization and society (Hartley, 2011). 
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The concept of Return on Investment (ROI) has been critical in determining the 
valuation and effectiveness of investments made in organizational management 
(Bingham & Goudreau, 2004). In recent years, the federal budget, including the defense 
budget, has received an increasing amount of attention (Sharp, 2012). Due to the Budget 
Control Act passed by Congress and the President in August of 2011, the Department of 
Defense in facing a reduction in federal funding of $487 billion over ten years (Sharp, 
2012). As a result, the importance of valuing ROI in Department of Defense programs 
has become even more important in ensuring that funding is being allocated for the most 
effective and valuable programs (Bingham & Goudreau, 2004). Evaluating ROI for 
defense requires a different approach than evaluating ROI for the private sector. 
Traditionally, ROI is a monetary percentage where the percentage ROI is equal to the 
ratio of earnings over the investment (Bourazanis & Gusnadi, 2005). 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑅𝑂𝐼 =    𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
However, the “earnings” produced by defense investments are not readily valued 
in terms of profits and revenues. Instead, other sources of hard data must be used to 
determine the value of earnings. The value of any government output can be measured 
using the four major categories of hard data: output, quality, cost, and time (Bourazanis 
& Gusnadi, 2005). Therefore, the ROI ratio can be described not using only monetary 
values but also through these four terms. Cost remains in monetary terms, and is included 
in both the investment and earnings portions of the ROI equation (Bourazanis & Gusnadi, 
2005). However, output, quality and time can also provide a substitute for revenue to 
describe the numerator. In order to increase the ROI for the Department of Defense 
investment, the desired goal would then be to save time, improve quality, and increase 
productivity (Bourazanis & Gusnadi, 2005).  
Currently, the Marine Corps leadership does not have a systematic process to link IT 
investments with its two primary ROI processes, Capital Planning Investment Control 
(CPIC) and Information Technology Steering Group (ITSG) (Shives, 2012). In addition, the 
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Marine Corps does not calculate an ROI percentage but rather conducts cost based analysis. 
This cost-based analysis is generated in the form of the Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE). A 
LCCE is generated at each Milestone Decision of a program in the defense acquisition 
process (Marine Corps Systems Command, 1998). The LCCE contains the methodologies, 
assumptions, definition of terms, cost drivers, factors, cost estimating worksheets and a cost 
model structure for a particular program. This information is used to provide a method for 
evaluating program alternatives (Marine Corps Systems Command, 1998). However, in the 
foreseeable future, investment, procurement, and life-cycle maintenance spending is likely to 
be reduced. Therefore, a disciplined and comprehensive approach for reviewing IT 
investments is essential for the DoD and the Marine Corps to operate in a constrained budget 
environment (Shives, 2012).    
7. Stakeholders 
There are multiple stakeholders involved in the investment of IT programs in the 
DoD. Typically, there are more stakeholders that are interested in a government entity 
investment than there would be in a private sector venture  (Bourazanis & Gusnadi, 
2005). In the private sector, primarily the organization is the interested stakeholder in the 
ROI of an investment decision (Bourazanis & Gusnadi, 2005). The groups most 
interested in the ROI of a government investment initiative would include the program 
participants, the immediate manager of the participants who support the program, the 
sponsor who initiates or approves the program, top administrators who manage the 
agency, the lawmakers who create laws and regulations concerning the accountability of 
programs, and taxpayers who are concerned about the use of tax dollars (Bourazanis & 
Gusnadi, 2005). Therefore, for Marine Corps IT investment decisions the following 
stakeholders would be interested in the outcome: the warfighter who will benefit from the 
investment, the defense industry, the program management, the Department of Defense 
leadership, the legislative branch of government, the executive branch of government, 
and the taxpayers (Fast, 2013). All of these stakeholders are impacted by investments in 
defense program acquisition and development (Fast, 2013).   
 19 
8. Joint Battle Command Platform 
The Joint Battle Command Platform (JBC-P) is an Army led joint digital battle 
command information Family of Systems (FoS) program designed to provide integrated, 
on-the-move, timely and relevant command and control (C2) and situational awareness 
(SA) to tactical combat, combat support commanders, leaders, and key C2 nodes. 
(HQMC CD&I, 2012). The program is an Acquisition Category II  (ACAT II) program 
designed to meet requirements established by the Joint Requirement Oversight Council 
(JROC) as a joint interest program supporting Tier 1 Joint Capability Areas of Joint C2, 
Joint Battlespace Awareness, and Joint Net-Centric Operations (Marine Corps Systems 
Command, 2012b). Specifically, it is designed to satisfy a JROC approved Capabilities 
Development Document (CDD) (HQMC CD&I, 2012). The United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) is participating in the JBC-P program under the authority of the Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) (MCSC, 2012b). The JBC-P is a Family of 
Systems that represents the next evolution of the Blue Force Tracker Family of Systems 
(HQMC CD&I, 2012). 
 
Figure 2.   BFT TOC Kit and HMMWV Mounted Variants (From Alexander, 2013) 
The JBC-P FoS program is an incremental development with two increments. The 
JBC-P FoS is defined as a weapon system program with a product line made up of 
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systems and products associated with the BFT FoS (Increment I) and JBC-P (Increment 
II) (MCSC, 2012b). The JBC-P FoS encompasses both Increment I and Increment II. 
Increment I consists of JCR software, BFT mounted systems, Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) Kits, the improved BFT-2 transceiver, and the KGV-72 National Security Agency 
(NSA) Type 1 Programmable In-Line Encryption Device (PIED) (MCSC, 2012b). 
Increment II is the JBC-P product that consists of JBC-P software, which will run on the 
hardware delivered under Increment I. Increment II also consist of a dismounted 
handheld computing platform (MCSC, 2012b). In addition, the JBC-P FoS will consist of 
three primary system types: vehicle-mounted systems, dismounted systems, and Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC) kits.  
 
Figure 3.  JCR Concept of Employment (COE) (From Alexander, 2013) 
The JBC-P is designed to achieve technical interoperability both vertically and 
horizontally across joint warfighting components in all operating environments 
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(Alexander, 2013). JBC-P capabilities are also designed to increase the accuracy and 
density of position location information (PLI) and the situational awareness (SA) picture 
to further reduce and manage fratricide risk (Alexander, 2013). In addition, increases in 
the accuracy of graphical overlays and the increased efficiency of orders transmission 
will provide commanders with improved friendly, hostile, neutral, unknown, and non-
combatant SA (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, 2011). The improvements to 
the previous BFT FBCB2 system for the JBC-P will address JROC convergence 
directives and increase interoperability between services (Alexander, 2013). The concept 
of employment of the JBC-P FoS is that it will be the primary generator of PLI for 
ground forces in the MAGTF. In addition, it is designed to be the primary digital 
command and control situational awareness (C2/SA) system for Marine battalions and 
below. It will also serve as a redundant C2/SA capability for the battalion and above 
(MCSC, 2012b). Therefore, the JBC–P FoS is designed to provide C2/SA capabilities at 
the platform level across the Army and Marine Corps to enable joint warfighters to gain 
and maintain the tactical and operational initiative under all mission, enemy, terrain, 
troops, time and civilians (METT-TC) conditions (MCSC, 2012a). 
E. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Development and Conversion Strategies 
Because the JBC-P FoS has largely already been developed and partially 
implemented, we will assess the effectiveness of the program’s development thus far, 
instead of proposing a separate development strategy. Initial feedback of the system has 
been largely positive as warfighter interviews consistently assess the capabilities as greater 
than previous systems in the areas of situational awareness and interoperability (Alexander, 
2013). Additionally, the development took a decidedly incremental approach to not only 
fielding, but also development. This gave the program the flexibility to make incremental 
changes to different platforms as the system was designed, rather than large after-the-fact 
modifications to the contract. This incremental approach has been particularly beneficial to 
the software development as each additional refinement creates new capabilities without 
sacrificing the core competencies of the system (Alexander, 2013). However, much of the 
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strategy was a top-down directed development program, with few indications of extensive 
field interviews in the early phases to assess the needs of the warfighter. Additionally, some 
believe that the because the U.S. Army has led the program management, many of the 
requested Marine Corps capabilities have been given a lower priority on the system, 
reducing the effectiveness for the Marines, while preserving system effectiveness according 
to U.S. Army specifications (Alexander, 2013). 
As we mentioned previously, in addition to development, the DoD has favored an 
incremental conversion strategy over the ill-fated flash cutover discussed in the FBI case 
study on the Trilogy system. This offers the DoD a number of advantages not possible 
with the flash cutover approach. First, incremental changes are more easily implemented 
if the conversion only occurs in a limited population of the ultimate deployment 
environment (Ambler, 2001). This advantage, while intuitive, is worth mentioning 
because of the dangerous environments in which these systems may operate. Should a 
critical system vulnerability or potential software exploit present itself in the first 6 
months of deployment, installing the required patch is much more manageable with an 
initially limited distribution of systems (Ambler, 2001). A second advantage is the 
scalability of the required training associated with the system. Regardless of design 
quality, training requirements will always need to be addressed when deploying a new 
system. The JBC-P is no different and the incremental roll out strategy allows trainers to 
successfully provide adequate training to the target population. The final benefit to the 
phased approach are the real options afforded to the program managers. If the system 
effectiveness is far below acceptable thresholds scrapping the program is much less 
costly if the program has been only partially implemented (Fink, 1998).  
Unfortunately, there a several risks to this phased adoption strategy. Most can be 
classified as temporary inefficiencies, including increased maintenance requirements, 
losses in economies of scale, and limited unit interoperability. Maintenance increases at 
higher echelons are expected as the requirement to support both systems will place a 
temporarily increased burden on support personnel. Furthermore, losses to economies of 
scale will be evident in rising replacement part costs and average repair time for 
inoperable systems. Finally, the phased adoption strategy may affect unit interoperability 
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as different units are equipped differently during the transition. The JBC-P is designed to 
mitigate, or at least reduce, this problem through backwards compatibility with the 
current BFT systems. Again, while these risks and inefficiencies can be, and have been, 
reduced, they cannot be eliminated and should be addressed in any phased adoption 
strategy, including the JBC-P. 
The capability to identify position location information is a capability that 
contributes to situational awareness. More specifically, identifying position information 
satisfies the situational awareness requirements to maintain the ability to gain knowledge 
regarding the status of friendly forces, enemy forces, other threats, neutral or civilian 
local population, and information regarding the area of operations (AO). The minimum 
acceptable performance of the receipt of position location information (PLI) is outlined in 
the Capabilities Development Document (CDD) for the JBC-P as the Key performance 
Parameters (KPP). The KPPs outline threshold and performance values for performance 
of the reception rate of PLI. The Objective values are the desired performance values 
and the threshold values are the minimum acceptable performance values 
(Acquisition Slide 3–01). The PM uses the difference between the objective and 
threshold values as “trade space” to manage his program. He uses the trade space to meet 
the desired capability of the program while also managing schedule and cost, making 
trade-offs where necessary but within the trade space (Acquisition Slide 3–01). Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP) 2 for the JBC-P specifies that the system must achieve a 
threshold of 75% and an objective of 95% (T/O) joint PLI in the immediate battle space 
and threshold of 65% and objective of 85% (T/O) in the extended battle space (MCSC, 
2012b). More clearly, the system must receive a minimum of 75% of the PLI in a battle 
space with a target of receiving 95% of the PLI in the immediate battle space. In addition, 
the system must be able to receive a minimum of 65% of the PLI in the extended battle 
space with the target received PLI to be 85% (MCSC, 2012b). 
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
This chapter will outline a method for measuring return on investment for the 
JBC-P program. This section will analyze the change in funding over time for the 
JBC-P. Additionally, it will present data regarding the program’s capabilities with 
relationship to cost. 
1. Assumptions 
This study includes several assumptions that were made in our strategic 
assessment of the JBC-P program. Our first assumption regards the amount of 
maintenance required for the JBC-P FoS. We assume that there is at minimum a small 
positive correlated between the amount of maintenance required and the effectiveness of 
the overall system. If maintenance levels are adequately funded to a minimum threshold 
than the overall system effectiveness will remain stable. In addition, we assume that after 
the threshold of effective maintenance is achieved, no further value is added by the 
addition of more support personnel. Our second assumption regards the access to 
information sources for the system. That there are adequate controls for “information 
overload,” and an increase in the quantitative sensor count will loosely correlate with an 
increase in the overall information available to the system.  Third, we assume that the 
large portion of the of the evaluation criteria presented within the categories of ‘system 
availability’ and ‘system effectiveness’ are mostly from an acquisition perspective and, to 
a lesser degree, the operational level of C2.  
We have also made several assumptions regarding the timeline analyzed in this 
study. The primary documents used to analyze the cost reduction initiatives do not 
specify the exact date that the initiatives were implemented. However, we were able to 
group the implementations of the cost reduction initiatives into the time periods from 
before and after the publication of the 2012 LCCE. Therefore, we assume that the first 
three cost reductions initiatives were implemented in FY11 while the rest of the identified 
initiatives implemented after the publication of the 2012 LCCE occurred in FY12. These 
assumptions have guided our analysis of the JBC-P FoS.  
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2. Strategic Goals 
A metric for value is required to understand the productivity output of the JBC-P 
FoS. The JBC-P program does not produce monetary revenue so value determination has 
to come from a capability, or a series of capability oriented metrics. Formally, the 
primary capabilities specified by USMC C4 that the JBC-P FoS is designed to satisfy 
include (HQMC CD&I, 2012): 
1. Exercise Command Leadership 
2. Enable Global & Regional Collaboration 
3. Achieve Situational Awareness (SA) 
4. Communicate Commander’s Intent & Guidance 
5. Plan Collaboratively 
6. Monitor & Assess Execution Effectiveness 
7. Collaborate 
In addition, four lesser enabling capabilities are also specified to be provided by 
the JBC-P FoS and these include (HQMC CD&I, 2012): 
1. Synchronize Execution Across All Domains 
2. Leverage Mission Partners 
3. Establish Organizational Relationships 
4. Process Information 
Many of the capability areas specified by USMC C4 are general and overlap each 
other. For this study, we will analyze capabilities the JBC-P FoS is designed to meet 
based on those capabilities listed by the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) (see Appendix B). 
According to the MAGTF C2 Roadmap, the JBC-P FoS is designed to meet JCA 5.1 and 
5.2. JCA 5.1 is specified as the capability to “collect information” and JCA 5.2 is defined 
as the capability to “achieve situational awareness” (HQMC CD&I, 2012). The 
definitions of these JCA capability areas will guide our selection of operationally defined 
metrics for JBC-P FoS output. 
3. JCA 5.1: Collect Information 
The MAGTF C2 Roadmap defines the JCA 5.2 “collect information” capability 
area as the ability to collect the data necessary to effectively and efficiently support 
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command and control (HQMC CD&I, 2012). More specifically, the MAGTF C2 
Roadmap further defines the requirements for achieving this capability area:  
This includes the ability to observe compliance with guidance, to monitor 
events and effects of decisions, to gather friendly force locations and 
status, and to access or obtain combat information, Identity Operations 
(IdOps) information and data, civil information, sensor data, and finished 
intelligence products. (HQMC CD&I, 2012, p 35-36) 
4. JCA 5.2: Achieve Situational Awareness 
JCA 5.2 “achieve situational awareness” is defined in the MAGTF C2 Roadmap 
as the capability to maintain understanding of a situation (HQMC CD&I, 2012). This 
capability spans across both physical and cyber domains, as well as the electromagnetic 
spectrum. This capability also requires the ability to gain knowledge regarding the status 
of friendly forces, enemy forces, other threats,  neutral or civilian local population, and 
information regarding the area of operations (AO) (HQMC CD&I, 2012). Maintaining 
this knowledge is based on the timely receipt of information that is collected from 
multiple nodes throughout the operating environment (HQMC CD&I, 2012). In addition, 
maintaining this knowledge is also dependent on the ability to effectively process and 
manage this information (HQMC CD&I, 2012). Achieving situational awareness includes 
the ability to create a common operational picture (COP) that provides a presentation of 
current information and an ability to forecast information. The common operational 
picture is created from the integration of processed information from sensors, analysts 
and data processors. The information is then displayed through an analysis and 
assessment of that information (HQMC CD&I, 2012). 
Achieving joint situational awareness is the primary capability that the JBC-P FoS 
is designed to provide. Situational awareness is an important military capability that 
enables planning, directing, and synchronizing all operations and other activities 
conducted in a specific AO for the local regional Combatant Commander (HQMC CD&I, 
2012). These activities can include logistics operations, cyberspace operations, air traffic 
control, electronic warfare, kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, fire support coordination, 
public affairs operations, and information operations. It also includes the ability to 
coordinate with higher, adjacent, and other units in the operating environment (HQMC 
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CD&I, 2012). This requirement for achieving situational awareness for the ground 
combat element (GCE), air combat element (ACE), logistics combat element (LCE), and 
the command element (CE) of the Marine Corps extend from the highest levels down to 
the squad level or service equivalent (HQMC CD&I, 2012). 
5. Defining the Variables 
This section will propose metrics for the evaluation of the strategic goals 
mentioned in the earlier section. We will accomplish this by evaluating a single program 
within the larger strategy as a vignette which can be applied to other programs and the 
Marine Corps C2 strategy as a whole. The scope of this paper will not include metrics for 
all programs within the larger strategy, but the metrics presented here, and the logic 
supporting them, can be applied as a template for similar programs within the larger C2 
portfolio. For our analytical approach, we will use the hierarchical multi-level 
representation of a System-of-Systems (SoS) capability as the framework. We will tailor 
this framework for our analysis of the JBC-P (Han, Fang, and DeLaurentis, 2012). 
This framework provides a method for logically connecting the capability metrics with 
the defined JCAs.  
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Figure 4.  Hierarchical multi-level representation of the JBC-P FoS capability areas and 
metrics (After Han et al., 2012) 
As is evident in the definitions of the joint capability areas, many of the 
requirements for JCA 5.1 are similar to the requirements put forth in JCA 5.2. The JBC-P 
FoS is designed to meet the requirements for both these joint capability areas. Therefore, 
the operationally defined variables that will be used as metrics for this study will be 
defined using the definitions for the requirements for both JCA 5.1 and 5.2. To satisfy 
JCA 5.1 “collect information” and JCA 5.2 “achieve situational awareness,” the 
definitions for these capability areas require that the system have the ability to present 
current information and forecast information, integrate information from a variety of 
inputs, gain knowledge of the status of all units in an AO, and have the ability to 
effectively process and manage this information (HQMC CD&I, 2012). The requirements 
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to integrate information from a variety of inputs and gain knowledge of the status of all 
units in an AO will be categorized as system availability. The requirements to present 
current information and forecast information, and effectively process and manage this 
information will be categorized as system effectiveness. 
The JBC-P FoS is designed to achieve both of our defined categories of system 
availability and system effectiveness. However, operational definitions for these 
categories had to be determined to be able to generate accurate metrics for the output of 
the JBC-P FoS. For the purposes of this study, six primary measurable metrics have been 
determined that will provide some insight in the ability for the JBC-P FoS to meet the 
requirements outlined in the JCA 5.2 and 5.1. According to the JBC-P FoS LCCE, the 
most critical capability that the JBC-P system provides is the ability to achieve situational 
awareness (MCSC, 2012b).  
6. System Availability 
For this study, system availability will be operationally defined as the number of 
fielded JBC-P Systems, the number of technical support personnel to maintain the 
systems, and the composition of each type of platform the system is installed (MCSC, 
2012b). The first operationally defined metric for system availability is the number of 
fielded systems both current and planned. The number of systems planned to be fielded 
are specified in the Approved Acquisition Objective. The JBC-P program Approved 
Acquisition Objectives (AAOs) allow for the following number of systems: 13,542 
mounted systems, 6,920 dismounted systems, and 1,371 TOC/Command Post (CP) kits. 
The total number of systems planned to be fielded on all platforms is 21,833 systems 
(MCSC, 2012b). In addition, the platforms the system will be hosted on will also be used 
as a metric for system availability. Currently, the platforms are divided into three 
categories: mounted systems, dismounted systems, and TOC/Command Post kits (MCSC, 
2012b). These platforms are related to system availability because an increased variety of 
platform types ensure that the system can be fielded to a variety of unit types throughout 
the battlefield, increasing system availability to the warfighter. In addition to the number 
and types of the systems, the last operationally defined metric for system availability is 
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the number of support personnel provided by the program management for system 
support (MCSC, 2012b). The amount of support personnel available to maintain fielded 
systems is related to system availability because the ability to operate and maintain 
currently fielded system impacts the ability of the warfighter to use the capability 
provided by the system and therefore its availability to him. 
It is important to note that, at least in part, these metrics for system availability 
were selected due to their widespread availability as well as their implied correlation to 
the topic at hand. Other metrics may in fact also reflect system availability and should be 
measured moving forward. These could include such metrics as, average system 
downtime over a fixed interval, average required time to restore system services and 
average system life cycle per deployed system.  
7. System Effectiveness 
The category defined as system effectiveness will be operationally defined as the 
reception rate of position location information (PLI), the rate at which the fielded systems 
are refreshed with new ones, and the expected life of the program. The reception rate of 
position location information is the percentage of received locational signals throughout a 
specified AO (MCSC, 2012b). An increased percentage of received location information 
in a given AO correlates to greater effectiveness of the system to provide an accurate 
common operating picture of units within an AO. In addition, the rate at which the 
fielded systems are refreshed indicate how current the technology of the system is and 
how effectively it will operate. Similarly, the expected life cycle of the program, writ 
large, or the length of time the system will be operationally fielded, provides an 
indication for how current the system will be with technological advances and peer 
technology. Therefore, PLI reception rates, system refresh rates, and the expected life 
cycle of the JBC-P FoS are all metrics for system effectiveness.  
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Metric Capability Category 
Number of Systems System availability 
Technical support for systems System availability 
Refresh rates System effectiveness 
Expected life cycle System effectiveness 
PLI reception rate System effectiveness 
System technology by type System availability 
Table 2.   The metrics and their associated capability categories 
B. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
This study will be qualitative description of the military capability provided by 
the JBC-P. This description will used to represent the value created by the program in 
order to describe the return on the investment in the program. The data will be 
categorized and analyzed through the lens of the ROI equation. However, instead a 
monetary value for numerator value of “earnings” in the ROI equation, we will use our 
categories output, quality, and time to represent the numerator. The denominator will 
continue to be valued according to cost.  𝑅𝑂𝐼  𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =   𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡,𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  
The metrics chosen for this study will reflect the four categories of hard data of 
output, quality, cost, and time. Our analysis will not be able to determine a single number 
value for ROI but rather a descriptive understanding about how the numerator changes 
will respect to changes in cost. 
C. COST COMPARISON 
1. JBC-P PROJECTED BASELINE FUNDING 
The JBC-P program is an upgrade to the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade & 
Below (FBCB2) technology. Initial funding for the JBC-P program began in September 
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2010 (IT investment dashboard). The JBC-P FoS program has since undergone a series of 
significant budget reductions. The initial Marine Corps baseline investment in the 
program in FY2010 was $2,159,000. The “will cost” baseline cost for program, or the 
expected cost without cost reductions, initially was planned through 2017 and is reflected 
in the following chart. 
 
Figure 5.  Baseline Will Cost Estimate of the JBC-P (After MCSC, 2012b)  
Beginning in October of 2011, a “should cost” analysis of the JBC-P FoS was 
conducted to determine what program areas could be subject to cost reduction initiatives 
(MCSC, 2012b). Seven areas were identified and three were initially implemented 
(MCSC, 2012b). The three program initiatives included the realignment and reduction of 
Field Support Technician (FST), revision of the technology refresh schedules, and 
through purchasing a commercial off the shelf (COTS) handheld product versus the 
originally planned ruggedized solution (MCSC, 2012b). With the incorporation of these 
cost reduction initiatives, the baseline funding for the program was reduced and is 
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Figure 6.  Baseline Should Cost Estimate of the JBC-P after the implementation of cost 
reduction initiatives (After MCSC, 2012b) 
2. LIFE CYCLE COST ESTIMATES 
In addition to the planned baseline funding through FY17, changes to the total 
LCCE have also been made due to budgetary pressures. The total LCCE in FY11 was 
$4,607,604,000. Meanwhile, the LCCE for FY12 was reduced to $4,163,764,430 through 
cost reduction initiatives. This difference represents a 9.6% decrease in the LCCE. 
Furthermore, between the FY12 LCCE and the FY13 LCCE, the JBC-P FoS program 
saw significant additional reductions in the expected life cycle cost. The total LCCE for 
FY12 was $4,163,764,430, in FY13 the LCCE was reduced to $1,661,449,101. The 
difference in these LCCE represents a 60% decrease from the FY12 estimate. The change 
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Figure 7.  Life Cycle Cost Estimate over time (After MCSC, 2012b) 
The total LCCE reduction from FY11 to FY12 was the result of the 
implementation of three cost reduction initiatives. The cost reduction initiative areas 
covered in this LCCE change include Field Support Technician (FST) 
realignment/reduction, revision of the technology refresh schedules, and through the 
purchase of a COTS handheld product versus the originally planned government 
designed ruggedized solution. The total LCCE reduction from FY12 to FY13 was the 
result of programmatic changes designed to achieve more cost savings (MCSC, 2012b). 
According to the Marine Corps Systems Command, the drivers for these cost reductions 
include the following: 
• Changes to the dismounted (Handheld) system pricing  
• The removal of the Beacon system from the JBC-P model  
• The removal of analogous systems such as DDACT (replaced by Nett 
Warrior) & the Beacon MTX, updated Bills of Material (BOMs)  
• Changing the IOC to FY14  
• Changing the FOC to FY16 





















• Accounting for systems and components already procured 
• Changes to the subsume date FY14 based on Funding Line 
• WBS/CES Changes   
• Updated Sunk Costs  
• Updates to the Fielding Schedule  
• Updated Testing Costs   
As already defined, the metrics that will be analyzed in this study include the 
changes to the number of systems, number of technical support for the systems, refresh 
rates, the expected life cycle, the PLI reception rate standard, and the system technology 
type as the measures for representing capability. In the following section the changes to 
these values will be analyzed as a result of these cost reductions.  
D. VALUE COMPARISON 
1. System Quantity 
The first metric to be evaluated with respect to the change in cost is the change in 
the number of systems that are scheduled to be delivered by the program. As mentioned 
earlier in this study, the number of systems authorized to be fielded is known as the 
Authorized Acquisition Objective (AAO). As a result of the first LCCE reduction in 
FY11, the AAO for the mounted systems, dismounted systems, and the TOC kits stayed 
the same at 13,542 mounted systems, 6,920 dismounted systems, and 1,371 TOC kits 
(MCSC, 2012b). However, from FY12 to FY13, the AAO for the dismounted systems 
and TOC kits was reduced as a result of cost reductions. This resulted in the number of 
mounted system remaining 13,542, but a large change in the dismounted AAO from 
6,920 to 1,354, and a smaller change in the AAO of the TOC kits from 1,371 to 1,166 
(MCSC, 2012b). Therefore, the major changes in the AAO due to the cost reduction 
initiatives were made to the number of dismounted systems. These changes are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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Fiscal Year FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 
Mounted 13542 13542 13542 13542 
Dismounted 6920 6920 1354 1354 
TOC 1371 1371 1166 1166 
Baseline LCCE $460,760,4000 $416,376,4430 $166,144,9107 $166,144,9107 
Table 3.   Change in AAO and cost with relationship to time (After MCSC, 2012b) 
 
Figure 8.  Change in AAO over time (After MCSC, 2012b) 
2. Field Support Technicians  
In addition to changes in the AAO, the cost reduction measures changed the 
number of support personnel available for the JBC-P system. Initial cost reduction 
measures in FY11 did not reduce the number of available Field Support Technicians 
(FSTs), which originally planned for 18 contractor provided FSTs (MCSC, 2012b). 
However, subsequent cost reduction initiatives included the reduction of contractor FSTs 
from 18 contractors to 8 personnel (MCSC, 2012b). These eight personnel would include 
4 contractors and 4 government employees (MCSC, 2012b). This cost reduction initiative 
therefore included the replacement of contractor support personnel with government 
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further reduced through another round of cost reduction initiatives from 8 contractors and 
government FSTs to 4 government FSTs (MCSC, 2012b). In summary, after all of the 
cost reductions have occurred, the number of FST will change from 18 contractor 
provided FSTs to 4 government provided FSTs (MCSC, 2012b). Table 4 summarizes the 
changes in FST support with respect to the changes in the baselines LCCE.   
Fiscal Year FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 
FST 18 18 8 4 
Baseline LCCE 4607604000 4163764430 1661449107 1661449107 
Table 4.   Change in FST support and cost with respect to time (After MCSC, 2012b) 
 
Figure 9.  Change in FST support personnel over time (After MCSC, 2012b) 
3. Refresh Rates 
The technology refresh schedules were also revised as a result of the changes to 
the baseline LCCE. Originally, all of the JBC-P system types (mounted, dismounted, and 
TOC kits) were to be refreshed every 3 years (MCSC, 2012b). As a result of the cost 
















different system types were altered (MCSC, 2012b). The new schedule has the 
dismounted systems refreshed every 2 years, the mounted systems every 5 years, and the 
TOC systems every 3 years (MCSC, 2012b). The contract implications for this change 
are that fewer systems in total will be purchased throughout the life cycle for the program 
(MCSC, 2012b). 
4. Expected Life Cycle 
The expected life cycle of the JBC-P program as extended as a result of the 
implementation of the cost reduction initiatives. Originally, the JBC-P program had the 
expected life cycle of 10 years from FOC (MCSC, 2012b). As a result of the cost 
reduction initiatives, the life cycle of the program was extended to twice that length to 
FOC plus 20 years. That would indicate that the program is now expected to last through 
FY36 (MCSC, 2012b). 
5. PLI Reception Rate Standard 
Another change in the program development, not incurred as a result of cost 
reduction initiatives, but still impacting capability was the change in the minimum C2/SA 
standard. Originally, for Increment 1 of JCR, the KPP of the system as specified in the 
DACT ORD was that the system must have C2/SA of 100% of the PLI. The Deputy 
Commandant, Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I) changed this parameter 
for Increment II as Key Performance Parameter (KPP) 2, which specifies that the system 
must receive a minimum threshold of 75% of the PLI in a battle space with a objective of 
receiving 95% of the PLI in the immediate battle space. In addition, the system must be 
able to receive a minimum threshold of 65% of the PLI in the extended battle space with 
the objective received PLI to be 85% (HQMC CD&I, 2012). 
6. System Technology Type 
Another metric to be evaluated with respect to the change in cost is the change in 
technology of the system. Specifically, this metric pertains to the change in the type of 
handheld system to be deployed as part of the USMC JBC-P program. Originally, the 
USMC planned to build a ruggedized government off the shelf (GOTS) product to use for 
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the handheld dismounted system. However, in an effort to further reduce costs, USMC 
decided to move to the U.S. Army Nett Warrior handheld COTS product for the 
dismounted system (MCSC, 2012b). The cost of the original GOTS system was $22,944 
per unit while the Army system was $2,460 per unit (MCSC, 2012b). These per unit 
process are significantly different, with the Nett Warrior system costing much less than 
the original ruggedized solution.  
E. DETERMINING TIPPING POINT 
The success of the JBC-P FoS is built upon the ability to accurately see all 
friendly units in an AO. Fielding fewer systems could impact the proliferation of the 
system throughout the Marine Corps. For this study, the minimum number of system for 
the program to be considered successful is the same as the number of systems required 
for the system to achieve initial operating capability (IOC). Cost reductions initiatives 
implemented for the JBC-P program have resulted in a reduction of the AAO for the 
quantity of fielded systems. The limits to which the cost to the program can be reduced 
and still maintain a military capability can be determined using the initial operating 
capability (IOC) as a benchmark. The IOC is a useful benchmark for determining the 
minimum capability of the system as it used as development milestone to demonstrate the 
minimum initial capability upon fielding.  
The number of IOC systems is defined as the number of systems required to be 
fielded for a Marine Corps Regiment (HQMC CD&I, 2012). This includes a minimum of 
11,987 mounted systems, 508 TOC kits, and 1,354 dismounted systems to achieve IOC 
(HQMC CD&I, 2012). As a result, units without any of the JBC-P FoS will not be 
represented with PLI and therefore not visible to the system. Reducing the number of 
systems will impact the availability of the system to many USMC units and may result in 
reduced PLI in an AO.  The Key Performance Parameter (KPP) 2 for the JBC-P specifies 
that the system must achieve a threshold of 75% and objective of 95% joint PLI in the 
immediate battle space and a threshold of 65% and an objective of 85% in the extended 
battle space (HQMC CD&I, 2012). Therefore, these PLI reception rates also represent a 
minimum performance criterion for program success. Success is also built upon the 
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ability for the system to remain operational. This would include operation and 
maintenance done by support personnel and the time between system refreshes. Reducing 
the number of support personnel negatively impacts the ability to effectively conduct the 
operation and maintenance of the JBC-P FoS. Therefore, success criteria will include 
adequate support from FSTs. The complete reduction of FSTs is therefore considered to 
be a failure of the program. These minimums for the number of available systems, the 
minimum reception rate of PLI, and support personnel represent a method for measuring 
program success.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the impact of cost reductions on the JBC-
P FoS program with respect to the metrics outlined in the previous chapter. It will provide 
an analysis of the program’s capabilities to determine ROI with relationship to these cost 
reductions.   
A. IMPACT OF COST REDUCTIONS TO THE METRICS 
1. Number of Systems 
The cost reduction initiative for the JBC-P FoS has resulted in a reduced AAO. A 
smaller AAO would indicate that fewer systems would be manufactured and fielded for 
use by the USMC. From FY12 to FY13, cost reductions reduced the total AAO from 
21,833 systems to 16,062 systems. This is a reduction of 5,771 systems and represents a 
21% decrease in the total number of systems scheduled to be fielded. The success of the 
JBC-P FoS is built upon the ability to accurately see all friendly units in an AO. Fielding 
fewer systems could impact the proliferation of the system throughout the Marine Corps. 
As a result, units without any of the JBC-P FoS may not be represented with PLI and 
therefore not visible to the system. Reducing the number of systems will impact the 
availability of the system to many USMC units and may result in reduced PLI in an AO. 
The Key Performance Parameter 2 for the JBC-P FoS specifies the system must receive a 
minimum of 75% of the PLI in a battle space with a objective of receiving 95% of the 
PLI in the immediate battle space (HQMC CD&I, 2012). In addition, the system must be 
able to receive a minimum of 65% of the PLI in the extended battle space with the 
objective received PLI to be 85% (HQMC CD&I, 2012). Reducing the number of 
systems to be fielded could impact the ability for all units in a given immediate or 
extended battle space to have their PLI actively received at minimum acceptable levels.  
2. Field Support Technicians (FSTs) 
The number of personnel dedicated to support the JBC-P was reduced and will be 
further reduced after several iterations of cost reductions. Originally, the total number of 
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Field Support Technicians (FSTs) consisted of 18 contractor personnel (MCSC, 2012b). 
However, after the implementation of initial cost reduction initiatives, that number was 
reduced to 8 total personnel, 4 contractor supplied and 4 DoD employees. Nevertheless, 
after another round of the implementation of cost reduction initiatives, that number was 
further reduced to 4 DoD personnel (MCSC, 2012b). The reduction in the number and 
type of available personnel can have significant impacts on the support available to 
maintain the effectiveness of the fielded JBC-P systems.  
Reducing the number of personnel available to provide support to the JBC-P 
program has several implications. First, reducing the number of personnel increases the 
scope of responsibilities for the remaining personnel. This includes repairing, training, 
installing, and maintaining a larger amount of systems per person (MCSC, 2012b). 
Reducing available qualified personnel while increasing the individual workload will also 
reduce the availability of those personnel to respond to support requests in a timely 
manner. This could impact the ability of the systems to continue to operate and therefore 
reduce their availability.  
The change in the type of FST available to support the system can also have an 
impact on its ability to operate effectively. Government employees have overtime caps 
and now are restricted by mandated furloughs which can impact their ability to support he 
fielded systems (ClearanceJobs.com, 2013). However, using government employees does 
allow for greater “in house” knowledge retention about the system. (Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, 2007). However, it can also be argued that contractors who developed 
the system have their own tools and potentially more intimate knowledge of the system 
than a government employee. Therefore, reducing the number of support personnel 
negatively impacts the ability to effectively conduct the operation and maintenance of the 
JBC-P FoS. As a result, the requirement category of system availability could be 
negatively impacted from cost reductions in this area.   
3. Refresh Rates 
Cost reduction initiatives include changing the rate at which the JBC-P system 
variants would be refreshed with new updated systems. Refresh rates have been changed 
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from occurring every three years for all system types, to two to five years per system 
type. Improvements to the dismountable variants of the JBC-P FoS will be made through 
planned hardware refreshes (MCSC, 2012b). This may result in a reduced ability to keep 
pace with technology advancement. According to Moore’s law, technology advances in 
integrated circuit technology will occur exponentially over time (Kurzweil, 2001). In 
addition, Ray Kurzweil suggests in the Law of Accelerating Returns that all technologies 
will continue to advance over time exponentially (Kurzweil, 2001). Therefore, increases 
in the time between scheduled technology refreshes could result in outdated systems not 
taking advantage of technological improvements required for the system to maintain a 
competitive advantage over other similar systems.  
4. Expected Life Cycle 
The expected life cycle of the JBC-P FoS was extended from 10 to 20 years as a 
result of the implementation of the cost reduction initiatives. Extending the life cycle 
incurs several risks to the effectiveness of the program. First, similar to the impact of 
reducing the number of system refreshes, extending the expected life cycle of the JBC-P 
may lead to the program becoming obsolete over time, or outdated by newer better 
systems (Tritsch & Young, 2011). In addition, the older a systems are at higher the risk of 
failures to the system due to system wear over time (Tritsch & Young, 2011). This is 
significant because doubling the expected life cycle of the system could result in the 
system’s life extending beyond the maturity phase of technological, life cycle and into the 
decline phase, where the utility of the technology is reduced continuously over time. 
According to Dr. Chandana Jayalath, “Towards the end of its life cycle, growth slows and 
may even begin to decline. In the later stages, no amount of new investment in that 
product will yield a normal rate of return” (2010). Therefore, the cost reduction initiatives 
have resulted in extending the life cycle of the JBC-P FoS that could impact the 
effectiveness of the system over time. As the program ages, advances in technology may 
outpace the capabilities of the system.  
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5. System Technology Type 
In an attempt to save money and meet the interoperability requirements with the 
Army as set forth in the JCR, the Marine Corps has adopted several of the technologies 
implemented in the Army’s Nett Warrior system. First, the requirement for the fielding of 
the Miniature Transmitter (MTX) beacon was dropped (MCSC, 2012b). The MTX 
Beacon was a tactical one-way PLI transmitter that was determined to be obsolete and 
removed from future systems (Alexander, 2013). This change in technology reduced the 
per unit cost for the JBC-P models (MCSC, 2012b). Dropping the beacon in favor of a 
more up to date technology did not likely negatively impact the capability provided by 
the JBC-P FoS. However, changes to the technology of the handheld systems to save on 
costs may have implications on system availability. 
The technology used for the dismounted handheld system of the JBC-P was 
changed to reduce cost. The requirement for the Dismounted Data Automated 
Communications Terminal (D-DACT), which was the Marine Corp’s handheld variant of 
the primary digital C2/SA system used in the initial BFT FBCB2 system, was removed 
from the program in favor of the Army’s Nett Warrior handheld solution. In addition, The 
JBC-P PM authorized the procurement of a COTS solution for the JBC-P handheld 
solution. The JBC-P PM decided that the U.S. Army’s handheld hardware component 
used in their Nett Warrior program, was to be used for the Marine Corps handheld device 
due to its significantly lower cost (MCSC, 2012b). However, a working group has been 
established to map the Nett Warrior device to the Marine Corps’ interoperability 
requirements. The impact that this system will have on the interoperability and 
functionality of the JBC-P handheld system is currently uncertain (Alexander, 2013). 
Development of this more inexpensive system could provide an increase interoperable 
capability at less cost. However, as a COTS system, the system may not perform as well 
in austere environments as the originally planned ruggedized GOTS handheld system. 
Significant savings have been made in reducing redundant handheld systems and in the 
elimination of older technology such as the MTX beacon; however using unproven 
COTS systems indicates an uncertain expected capability of performance of the new 
technology. Therefore, the impact of cost reduction initiatives on the technology type can 
be said to be mixed and uncertain. 
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B. EVALUATE CHANGE IN ROI FOR THE JBC-P 
1. Change in System Availability Capability Category 
This study analyzed several metrics that represented system availability for the 
JBC-P FoS. The return on investment (ROI) of the JBC-P FoS program for this study is 
described as capability over cost. Capability has been defined in two ways, as system 
availability and system effectiveness. Therefore, the change in ROI of the JBC-P FoS is 
evaluated as the change in system availability as a result of cost reduction initiatives. 
System availability was operationally defined as the number of fielded JBC-P Systems, 
the number of technical support personnel to maintain the systems, and the technology 
used. Cost was measured in dollars as the expected life cycle cost of the program. Both 
system availability and cost were evaluated over four fiscal years and three iterations of 
the implementation of cost reduction initiatives.  
In FY11, the life cycle cost estimate of the program was $4,607,604,000. In terms 
of system availability, this planned expenditure provided a program that consisted of 
21,833 total systems, supported by 18 contractor provided field support technicians, and a 
ruggedized handheld solution developed by the Marine Corps. By FY12, after initial cost 
reduction initiatives had been implemented, the life cycle cost estimate had been reduced 
by 9.6% to $4,163,764,430. Changes to system availability caused by this new level of 
funding include a reduction in the number of FSTs from 18 to 8 and the replacement of 
the handheld dismounted system for a COTS system. In addition, the beacon MTX was 
removed from future systems. However, these changes to technology type may not 
necessarily negatively impact the system availability of the JBC-P. The reason for this is 
that the COTS system is based on the Army’s Nett Warrior program and may therefore 
increase interoperability, which is a requirement of the program outlined in the JCR 
(Alexander, 2013). In addition, eliminating the MTX from the program may not 
negatively affect the program as the MTX was already becoming an outdated technology 
(Alexander, 2013). The second cost reduction initiative from FY12 to FY13 resulted in 
further reduction in the life cycle cost estimate by another 54% from the original life 
cycle cost estimate to $1,661,449,101. This reduced cost was the result of changes to 
system availability to include the reduction in the AAO for the JBC-P by 26% from 
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21,833 to 16,062 systems (MCSC, 2012b). This cost reduction also resulted in further 
reductions to the number of FSTs by 50%. This was a change from 8 FSTs, 4 government 
employees and 4 contractors, to only 4 government support personnel (MCSC, 2012b). 
These iterations of cost reductions have reduced the return on investment in terms of 
system availability, with each subsequently larger reduction in cost having a larger 
reduction in system availability.  
2. Change in System Effectiveness Capability Category 
This study analyzed several metrics that represented system availability for the 
JBC-P FoS. The return on investment (ROI) of the JBC-P FoS program is described as 
capability over cost. In addition to system availability as already discussed, the change in 
ROI of the JBC-P FoS was evaluated as the change in system effectiveness as a result of 
cost reduction initiatives. System effectiveness has been operationally defined in this 
study as the reception rate of position location information (PLI), the rate at which the 
fielded systems are refreshed with new ones, and the expected life of the program. Cost is 
measured in dollars as the expected life cycle cost estimate of the program. Both system 
effectiveness and cost were evaluated over four fiscal years and three iterations of the 
implementation of cost reduction initiatives. 
In FY11, the life cycle cost estimate of the program was $4,607,604,000. In terms 
of system effectiveness, system refreshes were to occur every 3 years, and the expected 
life cycle of the program was 10 years. After initial cost reduction initiatives had been 
implemented, the cost had been reduced by 9.6% to $4,163,764,430 by FY12 (MCSC, 
2012b). Changes to system effectiveness include the revision of the technology refresh 
schedules. Instead of the original 3-year refresh schedule for all system types (mounted, 
dismounted, and TOC kits), the new schedule has scheduled refreshes to the dismounted 
systems every 2 years, the mounted systems every 5 years, and the TOC systems every 3 
years (MCSC, 2012b). Extending the refresh schedules results in longer time periods 
before fielded system are upgraded and kept up to date. In addition, subsequent cost 
reductions resulted in the extension of the expected life of the program from 10 years to 
20. The longer life expectancy of the system may risk system obsolescence. The last 
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metric for system effectiveness that was implemented prior to the cost reduction 
initiatives is the reception rate for PLI. Early in the program the PLI reception rate 
standard was reduced from a threshold and objective of 100% reception rate to a 
minimum threshold of 75% of the PLI in a battle space and an objective of 95% of the 
PLI in the immediate battle space. In addition, the system must be able to receive a 
minimum threshold of 65% of the PLI in the extended battle space and an objective of 
received PLI to be 85% (HQMC CD&I, 2012). This change, though not directly related 
to budget reduction impacts the standard for performance of the system and therefore it’s 
effectiveness. As a result of these iterations of cost reduction and programmatic changes, 
it can be concluded that over time and subsequent cost reduction initiatives, system 
effectiveness of the JBC-P has been iteratively reduced.  
C. RISK 
The analysis of the JBC-P cost reduction initiatives has provided insight into the 
risks associated with such measures. This study outlines how several iterations of cost 
reduction initiatives have resulted in an systematic decline in system availability and 
system effectiveness. As a result, several risks have been identified as a result of this cost 
reduction strategy. These risks include financial risk, operational risk, compliance risk, 
strategic risk, and reputational risk (KPMG International, 2009). Financial risk is defined 
as the risk of failure to deliver on the business case for the program or the risk for 
program failure and wasted funding as a result of program failure. Operational risk 
includes risk to the organizations ability to deliver an effective product that will enhance 
the warfighter (KPMG International, 2009). Compliance risk is the risk associated with 
the program’s ability to meet its requirements. Strategic risk is the risk that the failure to 
deliver an effective program will impact the ability for the organization to meet its 
strategic priorities. Lastly, reputational risk is the risk of damage to the organization’s 
reputation, image and perceived commitment to its stakeholders.  
The JBC-P FoS cost reduction initiatives have incurred financial, operational, 
compliance, strategic, and reputational risk. With each cost reduction initiative that is 
implemented, the program becomes closer to falling below acceptable performance 
standards. This study defined this failure point, or “tipping point,” as falling below the 
minimum capability required for system IOC. Failure to provide the capabilities outlined 
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in the business case for the program resulting from these cost reductions would be a 
financial loss for the taxpayer and the organization. Therefore, cost reductions for the 
JBC-P have incurred financial risk. The cost reductions outlined in this study also create 
operational risk to the Marine Corps. As evidenced in this study, cost reductions have 
reduced the available support personnel for the JBC-P FoS, extended the refresh 
schedules, changed the technology of the systems, and lengthened the expected life of the 
program. All of these changes impact the ability of the system to support the warfighter. 
Therefore, these cost reductions have incurred operational risk to the warfighter and the 
Marine Corps.   
The JBC-P cost reduction initiatives have also created compliance, strategic and 
reputational risk. Compliance risk is created as cost reductions further degrade the ability 
of the program to meet the program requirements outlined by the JROC. However, the 
compliance risk created from cost reductions is less compared to the other types of risk 
outlined in this section. Cost reductions for the JBC-P FoS have also resulted in the 
adoption of the Army’s nett warrior technology, which may or may not be compatible 
with current Marine Corps C2/SA architecture and interoperability requirements 
(Alexander, 2013). Therefore, the degree of compliance risk generated from the cost 
reduction initiatives is uncertain. In addition to compliance risk, strategic risk is also 
created with the large scale cost reductions. There is the strategic risk that if cost 
reductions continue, the JBC-P program may continue to lose capabilities and fail to 
support the Marine Corp’s larger IT strategy. Lastly, reputational risk is created from the 
cost reduction initiatives. Failure to develop a functional, joint C2/SA system as 
mandated by the JROC may negatively damage the perceived ability for the Marine 
Corps to develop joint capable systems. In addition, there is potential for reputational 
damage as a result of the austere financial environment of the DoD. Any program failure 
could be perceived by the taxpayer as financial waste and could potentially damage the 
image of the organization. The analysis conducted for this study has determined and 
identified that the cost reduction initiatives implemented with the JBC-P program have 




A. MANAGING RISK AND ROI WITH REGARD TO REDUCING 
FUNDING FOR IT PROGRAMS 
The analysis in this study has highlighted the importance of understanding the 
importance of accurately measuring the return on investment of IT programs as the 
funding for those programs is reduced. As a result, accurate measures for ROI and risk 
management should be employed to facilitate better decision making by DoD leadership. 
We assume that the cost reduction measures implemented for the JBC-P FoS program 
were implemented in order to achieve the greatest reduction in cost while making the 
least change to the program. The data in this study does not provide explicit justification 
for the cost reduction initiatives implemented in the JBC-P program. According to the 
JBC-P FoS LCCE, the justification for the cost reduction was to: 
Identify program initiatives which, if implemented, would result in cost 
reductions for the program. The Should Cost Analysis used the Will-Cost 
Estimate (i.e., LCCE) that was developed in August 2011 as the base, and 
developed discrete, measurable items, management initiatives, 
efficiencies, and risk mitigation actions for savings against that base. 
(MCSC, 2012b, p 83) 
This study has identified and described how the JBC-P program has undergone a 
series of significant budget reductions. These reductions have changed and reduced the 
capability of the program. This study has identified that the impact of cost savings on the 
program has only been identified through joint program capability areas, such as JCA 5.1 
and 5.2. The data indicates that there is not a clear understanding of the effect that the 
impact on the cost reduction initiatives have on the program holistically. In order to more 
accurately understand the impact of such cost reduction measures, the USMC and DoD 
decision makers should develop of metric for measuring the value of the program in all 
its aspects. This study has described these impacts through a variety of different metrics. 
A single metric would provide a better measurement for understanding how to better 
reduce funding for this program and future programs.  
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Similar to understanding the impact cost reduction has on the ROI of IT 
programs, it is important to understanding and measure the risks associated with such 
measures. This study has highlighted that there is risk to the organization as well as risk 
to the program, when cost reductions are implemented. For this study we established six 
risk areas, financial, operational, compliance, strategic, and reputational risk. These risk 
categories provide a framework for understanding the impact that cost reduction for the 
JBC-P program had on both the program and the organization. Improved risk 
management and implementation of cost reductions in such large scale cost reduction 
measures may improve program management and the value of the program.  
B. EFFECTIVELY MANAGING BUDGET REDUCTIONS  
The importance of valuing ROI in Department of Defense programs has become 
even more important in ensuring that funding is being allocated for the most effective and 
valuable programs (Bingham & Goudreau, 2004). This study has measured the impact of 
cost reductions heuristically and descriptively as a function of output (value) over input 
(cost). Assigning a single metric for measuring the value of a program would provide a 
more accurate representation of ROI for such investments. We recommend that such an 
approach could be achieved through the Knowledge Value Added  (KVA) methodology. 
The KVA approach provides a method for creating market comparable revenue for non-
profit organizations using a common output called units of Knowledge (Bourazanis & 
Gusnadi, 2005). We recommend that this same approach could be applied the JBC-P 
program as well as any IT investment throughout the USMC. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The analysis conducted in this case study of the JBC-P program has provided 
insight in to the impact of cost reductions on this IT program. The data clearly shows 
consistent and repeated implementation of cost reduction initiatives over several fiscal 
years. In addition, the data also shows that the military capability provided by the 
program has also been consistently reduced over several fiscal years. These findings 
show that the ability of the program to meet the JCA 5.1 and 5.2 are reduced as funding is 
reduced. The data does not definitely demonstrate that the cost reductions are incurring a 
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vicious cycle of further cost reductions. However, vicious cycle behavior with regards to 
consistent cost cutting is evident. Each cost reduction to the program is associated with 
subsequent reduction in the military value of the program. In addition, over the several 
fiscal years examined in this study, the cost reductions became larger over time and so 
did the reduction in capability. Due to the relatively short period of time analyzed in this 
study, we cannot determine whether this trend will continue. Therefore, it cannot be 
determined if this program is in a vicious cycle death spiral. However, if the trends 
identified do continue than there would be strong evidence to indicate that the program is 
in danger of reducing its cost to the point of destroying the value provided by the 
program. In order to prevent this, we recommend conducting a systematic analysis of all 
activities and elements of the program to determine where cost reductions can be best 
applied if further reductions are deemed necessary. We also recommend doing the same 
analysis throughout all IT programs in the Marine Corps to better manage the Marine 
Corps IT portfolio. 
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This chapter provides recommendations for further research to better determine 
how to better conduct cost reductions and manage the Marine Corps IT portfolio to 
prevent vicious cycles generated from cost reductions.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Further Research into Cost Reductions and the Marine Corps IT 
Acquisition Portfolio  
Findings from this analysis provide a practical view from the perspective of 
program management regarding the complexity of responding to budget pressures while 
simultaneously maintaining continued military effectiveness. Conducting an analysis of 
cost reductions across all IT program through the Marine Corps may provide greater 
insight to the impact that cost reductions are having on the IT capability of the 
organization as a whole. A thorough analysis of the Marine Corps IT portfolio may 
provide a better picture of the value provided by IT investments. Such an analysis may 
allow the Marine Corps to identify vicious cycles and manage them before they 
significantly impact the organizations capability.  
2. Analyze JBC-P Program Using KVA Analysis 
The analysis in this study is insufficient to determine the best method for 
conducting further cost reductions for the JBC-P. There is a need for better identification 
of the activities within the program where cost reductions will have the most limited 
effect on the value produced. KVA analysis is a useful tool that could enable more 
effective cost reductions and would provide important data regarding the program. We 
recommend conducting a KVA analysis of this program or any other Marine Corps IT 
investment undergoing cost reductions.     
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APPENDIX A. FY13 MAGTF C2 SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
 







































































































































MAGTF C2 SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS (SOS)
This illustration depicts the entire MAGTF C2 SoS Capability 
divided by “Core” MAGTF C2 Systems, Critical Associated 
MAGTF C2 Systems, and Associated MAGTF C2 Systems. It 
also exhibits the repeatable and evolving nature of the MAGTF 
C2 Roadmap. The FY13 infographic “Iceberg” concept evolved 
from the FY12 version to illustrate not only the Core MAGTF 
C2 Portfolio, but also the critical associated and associated 
C2 systems that comprise the entire holistic MAGTF C2 SoS. 
Please refer to Section 4 (MAGTF C2 Materiel) for detailed 
information on each Program in the SoS.
Figure 1.3: FY13 MAGTF C2 SoS
CLASSIFICATION OVERVIEW FOR FY13
*As a result of the POM-15 CBA IA will migrate to Cyber 
Integration Division
*
FY13 MAGTF C2 ROADMAP   : : 12 
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APPENDIX B. CORE USMC MAGTF C2 PROGRAMS V. JOINT 
CAPABILITY AREAS 
 














































































































5.1 5.3 6.2 1.45.2 6.1 6.46.3 9.4
Core MAGTF C2 PORs v. 
Joint Capability Areas 
(JCAs)
FY13 MAGTF C2 ROADMAP   : : 32
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